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RULES 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Collins Ochieng appeals from the district court's order denying his "Motion 
for Obtaining an Order Modifying the Original Conviction and Sentence." 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Ochieng, 32 years of age, raped K.K., a fifteen year old girl. (PSI, pp.1-2.) 
K.K. reported the rape to the Bannock County Sheriff's Department. (PSI, p.1.) 
The state charged Ochieng with rape, Ochieng waived his right to a preliminary 
hearing and the case was bound over to district court. (R., pp.26-33.) Ochieng 
pled guilty to an amended charge of injury to a child, in violation of Idaho Code 
§ 18-1501(1). (R., pp.3646.) The district court imposed a unified sentence of 
ten years with three years fixed, suspended sentence, and placed Ochieng on 
probation for ten years. (R., pp.51-57.) As a condition of probation, the district 
court also ordered Ochieng to serve 365 days in the Bannock County Jail, and 
noted that Ochieng could be deported while serving the jail time. (R., p.55.) 
Ochieng did not appeal his sentence. (R., p.80.) Over one year and eight 
months after sentencing, Ochieng filed a "Motion for Obtaining an Order 
Modifying the Original Conviction and Sentence" and a motion for appointment of 
counsel.' (R., pp.58-71.) On September 4, 2007, Ochieng requested a hearing 
on those motions. (R., pp.77-78.) The district court denied the motions. (R., 
pp.79-81.) Ochieng filed a motion to reconsider a few days later. (R., pp.82-87.) 
Although Ochieng filed his motion for counsel on May 29, 2007, his attorney of 
record did not file a notice of intent to withdraw from Ochieng's case until July 3, 
2007. (R., pp.70-77.) 
The district court denied Ochieng's motion to reconsider. (R., pp.88-90.) 
Ochieng timely appealed. (R., pp.91-92; 108-1 11 .) 
ISSUES 
Ochieng states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court err when it sua sponte summarily 
dismissed, prior to any response by the State, Mr. Ochieng's 
petition for post-conviction relief because he failed to allege 
facts in his Petition that would defend against an affirmative 
defense that the State was required to raise, or would 
waive? 
2. Did the district court err when it sua sponte summarily 
dismissed Mr. Ochieng's petition for post-conviction relief 
without providing a notice of its intent to dismiss? 
3. Did the district court err when is [sic] sua sponte summarily 
dismissed Mr. Ochieng's petition for post-Conviction [sic] 
relief without ruling on Mr. Ochieng's motion for appointment 
of counsel? 
(Appellant's brief, p.9.) 
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
1. Has Ochieng failed to establish the district court erred when it dismissed 
Ochieng's "petition" as time barred? 
2. Has Ochieng failed to establish the district court erred when it denied his 
request for counsel? 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
Ochiena Has Failed To Establish The District Court Erred When It Dismissed 
Ochieng's "Petition" As Time Barred 
A. Introduction 
Ochieng claims the district court erred when it sua sponfe dismissed his 
petition for post-conviction relief as untimely. (Appellant's brief, p.10.) 
Specifically, Ochieng asserts "Mailure to comply with the Statute of Limitations is 
an affirmative defense that the State would have had to have raised in its 
response to [Ochieng's] petition, or else it would have been considered waived." 
(Id., at p.17.) Because, Ochieng argues, the state did not file an answer to 
Ochieng's petition raising timeliness as an affirmative defense, the district court 
erred with its sua sponte dismissal on the same grounds. (Id., at pp.10, 16-18.) 
Ochieng further argues that this dismissal was reversible error because the 
district court failed to give Ochieng notice of the dismissal. (Id. at pp.10, 18-20.) 
Assuming for purposes of argument that Ochieng's motion was a petition 
for post-conviction relief, Ochieng's claims fail for two reasons. First, the state 
was not required to raise the timeliness issue as an affirmative defense. Under 
the UPCPA, the district court may dismiss, sua sponfe, an untimely petition for 
post-conviction relief. Second, because the district court explained its reasons 
for denying the petition, and Ochieng responded to those reasons accordingly 
with his Motion for Reconsideration, Ochieng effectively received notice such that 
the district court did not err by dismissing the petition as untimely. 
B. Standard of Review 
The appellate court exercises free review over the district court's 
application of the Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act. Evensioskv v. State, 
136 Idaho 189, 190, 30 P.3d 967, 968 (2001). 
C. Ochiena Has Failed To Establish The District Court Erred When It 
Dismissed Ochiena's "~etition"' As Time Barred 
Ochieng asserts that the district court erred in dismissing his petition for 
two reasons. First, Ochieng argues the district court could not sua sponte 
dismiss the petition based on the statute of limitations because, he claims, the 
statute of limitations can only be raised as an affirmative defense. Second, 
Ochieng argues, dismissal was improper because he was not given the 
opportunity to respond to the reasons for dismissal as required by I.C. 3 19- 
4906(b). Both of Ochieng's claims fail. Although the district court made no 
definitive finding in this regard, because it analyzed the motion as a post- 
conviction petition, the state will assume for purposes of appeal that Ochieng's 
motion constituted a petition for post-conviction relief and will refer to the motion 
as a petition. 
' As noted by the district court, "It is not clear to the Court whether [Ochieng's 
motion] is meant to be a Rule 35 Motion or a Petition for Post Conviction Relief." 
(R., p.80.) 
I. Contrarv To Ochieng's Assertion, The Failure To Comply With The 
Statute Of Limitations Is Not An Affirmative Defense The State 
Must Raise Or Waive, And The District Court Properlv Dismissed 
The Petition On This Basis 
Ochieng contends the district court erred in applying the statute of 
limitations to his petition, because, he asserts, the "[fjailure to comply with the 
Statute of Limitations is an affirmative defense that the State would have had to 
have raised in its response to [Ochieng's] petition, or else it would have been 
considered waived." (Appellant's brief, p.17.) Ochieng relies on Cole v. State, 
135 ldaho 107, 15 P.3d 820 (2000), in support of his argument. Cole, however, 
does not stand for this proposition. Rather, the court in Q& merely held that a 
failure to comply with time limitations does not create a jurisdictional defect in an 
application for post-conviction relief that would allow the state to raise the issue 
for the first time on appeal. 135 ldaho at 110, 15 P.2d at 823. 
Contrary to Ochieng's assertion, I.C. 3 19-4906(b) "authorizes the trial 
court to raise issues sua sponte . . . . Under the terns of this statute, a trial court, 
in determining whether the applicant 'is not entitled to post-conviction relief,' is 
not limited to defenses pleaded by the State." Martinez v. State, 130 ldaho 530, 
533, 944 P.2d 127 (Ct. App.1997). Because the UPCPA specifically provides a 
time limit on filing a post-conviction petition, "it [is] proper for the district court to 
consider the statute of limitation though this defense [is] not raised by the State." 
Martinez, supra. 
In this case, the district court correctly concluded Ochieng's petition was 
untimely. The district court entered judgment upon Ochieng's guilty plea to injury 
to a child on September 2, 2005. (R., pp.51-59.) Ochieng did not appeal from 
the judgment. (R., p.80.) Therefore, to be timely, Ochieng's post-conviction 
petition must have been filed within one year and 42 days after the entry of 
judgment. I.C. § 19-4902(a); I.A.R. 14. Ochieng did not file his petition until May 
29, 2007 (R., pp.79-81)' nearly two years after his judgment became final. 
Ochieng's petition was untimely and the district court properly dismissed it on this 
basis. 
2. Because Ochiena Had The Opportunitv Respond To The Court's 
Grounds For Dismissal, He Effectivelv Received The Notice 
Required Bv I.C. 5 19-4906(b) 
If a district court decides sua sponte to dismiss a post-conviction petition, 
I.C. § 19-4906(b) requires the court to give the petitioner notice of the reasons for 
its contemplated dismissal and an opportunity, within 20 days, to respond. I.C. § 
19-4906(b); Savkahamchone v. State, 127 ldaho 319, 321, 900 P.2d 795, 797 
(1995); Downinq v. State, 132 ldaho 861, 863, 979 P.2d 1219, 1221 (Ct. App. 
1999). The purpose of the 20-day notice requirement of I.C. 3 19-4906(b) is to 
ensure that the applicant will have an opportunity to challenge an adverse 
decision before it becomes final. Baruth v. Gardner, 110 Idaho 156, 158, 715 
P.2d 369, 371 (Ct. App. 1986); Gibbs v. State, 103 ldaho 758, 759, 653 P.2d 
813, 814 (Ct. App. 1982). 
Ochieng argues that the district court did not give him proper notice of its 
intent to dismiss his petition and that "[iln doing so the district court denied 
[Ochieng] of the substantial right of receiving notice of and the opportunity to be 
heard regarding the viability of his petition." (Appellant's brief, p.18.) Although 
the district court did not issue a formal notice of its intent to dismiss, it did clearly 
state the reasons for dismissal in its September 7, 2007 "Order Re: Motion." (R., 
pp.79-81.) In that order, the district court put Ochieng on notice that his petition 
was time barred and dismissed the petition on that basis. (Id.) In response, 
Ochieng filed a motion for reconsideration in which he directly addressed the 
timeliness issue by claiming the statute of limitations should be tolled due to 
ineffective assistance of counsel. (R., pp.82-83.) Ineffective assistance of 
counsel is not, however, a basis for tolling the post-conviction statute of limitation 
in ldaho except where counsel failed to include a claim previously raised by the 
petitioner. Hernandez v. State, 133 ldaho 794, 992 P.2d 789 (Ct. App. 1999). 
Rather, the ldaho appellate courts have recognized tolling only where an 
applicant is prevented, either by mental disease or by being denied access to 
courts, from earlier pursuing challenges to his or her conviction. Sayas v. State, 
139 ldaho 957, 960, 88 P.3d 776, 779 (Ct. App. 2003); Anderson v. State, 133 
ldaho 788, 791, 992 P.2d 783, 786 (Ct. App. 1999); Abbott v. State, 129 ldaho 
381, 385,924 P.2d 1225, 1229 (Ct. App. 1996). 
The district court's dismissal set forth the reasons for the denial of 
Ochieng's "petition" - that it was not timely under I.C. !j 19-4902(a). Because 
Ochieng took the opportunity to respond to the timeliness issue with a motion for 
reconsideration asserting equitable tolling, and the district court in turn 
considered that motion, Ochieng has failed to establish reversible error based on 
a lack of notice. 
II. 
Ochiena Has Failed To Establish The District Court Erred When It Denied 
Ochiena's Reauest For Counsel 
A. Introduction 
Ochieng argues that because his "petition set forth facts sufficient to 
establish a possible viable claim for post-conviction relief," the district court 
"committed reversible error in failing to appoint [him] counsel prior to summarily 
dismissing his petition." (Appellant's brief, p.25.) Ochieng's claim fails because 
his petition was time-barred under the UPCPA, thus he was not entitled to post- 
conviction counsel and the district court did not err in denying his request to 
appoint counsel. In addition, any error that the district court may have made by 
denying the motion for counsel within the same order as the petition was 
harmless 
B. Standard of Review 
The decision to grant or deny a request for court-appointed counsel to 
represent a post-conviction petitioner pursuant to I.C. !j 19-4904 is discretionary. 
Plant v. State, 143 ldaho 758, 761, 152 P.3d 629, 632 (Ct. App. 2007). "In 
reviewing the denial of a motion for appointment of counsel in post-conviction 
proceedings, '[tlhis Court will not set aside the trial court's findings of fact unless 
they are clearly erroneous. As to questions of law, this Court exercises free 
review."' Charboneau v. State, 140 ldaho 789, 792, 102 P.3d 1108, 11 11 (2004) 
(quoting Brown v. State, 135 ldaho 676, 678, 23 P.3d 138, 140 (2001)). 
C. Ochiena Has Failed To Establish The District Court Erred When It Denied 
Ochienq's Request For Counsel 
Under the UPCPA, a court-appointed attorney may be made available to 
an applicant who is unable to afford counsel. I.C. $ 19-4904. The decision to 
grant or deny a request for court-appointed counsel in post-conviction 
proceedings is within the discretion of the district court. Charboneau, 140 ldaho 
at 792, 102 P.3d at 111 1. If the district court fails to rule on a motion for 
appointment of counsel prior to dismissal of a petition on the merits, an appellate 
court should determine whether the error was harmless because the petition did 
not allege facts prerequisite to appointment of counsel. Fox v. State, 129 ldaho 
881, 885, 934 P.2d 947, 951 (Ct. App. 1997) (failure to rule on motion for 
appointment of counsel not harmless); Swisher v. State, 129 ldaho 467, 469-71, 
926 P.2d 1314, 1316-18 (Ct. App. 1996) (failure to rule on motion for counsel 
harmless); see also I.R.C.P. 61 (no error is grounds for vacating an order or 
judgment unless it is "inconsistent with substantial justice" and court "must 
disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does not affect the 
substantial rights of the parties"). A district court may deny a motion for 
appointment of counsel if the court determines that the petitioner's claims are 
frivolous. I.C. § 19-852. 
Applying these standards to this case shows that the district court did not 
err when it denied Ochieng's request for counsel. Ochieng's alleged claims for 
post-conviction relief were time-barred. His petition was, therefore, frivolous and 
Ochieng was not denied a substantial right when the district court denied his 
request for appointed counsel without addressing the substantive claims in his 
petition. Swisher, 129 Idaho at 470-71, 926 P.2d at 1317-1 8. 
To the extent Ochieng claims error based on his assertion that the court 
failed to rule on his request for counsel before dismissing his petition, the record 
does not support his assertion. Although the district court denied appointment of 
counsel within the same order that it dismissed Ochieng's petition (R., pp.79-81), 
the record does not provide any evidence that the district court failed to consider 
Ochieng's motion for counsel before it dismissed his petition. To the extent the 
district court failed to consider Ochieng's request for counsel before dismissing 
his petition's merits, the error was harmless since the petition was time-barred 
and therefore frivolous. 
CONCLUSION 
The State respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
order denying Ochieng's "Motion for Obtaining an Order Modifying the Original 
Conviction and Sentence," and its order denying his request for counsel. 
DATED this 23rd day of December 2008. 
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